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I. THE KLAMATH CONFLICT: FISH AND BIRDS BUT NOT ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES
A. The Imposition of a Working Landscape on an Ecosystem
The Upper Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern
California has long been characterized by its aridity, remoteness
from population centers, and short growing season. Today, the entire Klamath Basin is known for the intensity and bitterness of the
competing demands for its limited, dependable water supplies.
The Upper Basin irrigation community’s entrenched water entitlements, enjoyed undisturbed for a century, 1 are being challenged
by Indian tribes, government and non-governmental entities acting to enforce the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 2 and Lower Basin fishing communities. 3
Over a century of intensive upstream irrigation diversions and
dams has produced a highly stressed ecosystem from headwaters
to the Pacific Ocean. Before white settlement, the Upper Basin
was one of the West’s great functioning wetland ecosystems, a vast
network of interconnected shallow lakes and marshes. 4 The
Klamath ecosystem sustained both wildlife and Indians. 5 The
marshlands of the Upper Basin supported large local and migratory bird populations as well as populations of two large (up to two
feet long), long-lived (surviving up to thirty or forty years) fish
called qapdo and c’wam. 6 These fish were venerated by the
Klamath Indians, for whom they provided a major food source. 7
The ecosystem survived relatively intact until the end of the nineteenth century; however, as was the case in many of areas of the
world, a productive ecosystem was shrunk in size and in function
to permit irrigated agriculture.
1. See RICHARD A. SLAUGHTER, JOINT INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE ATMOSPHERE
AND OCEAN, WATER ALLOCATION UNDER STRESS: INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON OR SNAKE AND
KLAMATH RIVER 19 (2004) (the Snake River basin has a long history of adaptation to change
compared to Klamath, which had no history of adaptation prior to 2001).
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2006).
3. The Klamath is actually two basins, an upper and lower. The Upper Basin lies on
the fringe of the Great Basin. The Lower Basin encompasses a large part of far northwestern
California and runs to the Pacific through a rugged mountainous terrain. Indian tribes and
commercial and recreational fishermen have long prized the river for its salmon runs. See
Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath
Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 289-92 (2003) [hereinafter Fish, Farms, and the Clash].
4. See id. at 291.
5. See TUPPER ANSEL BLAKE ET AL., BALANCING WATER: RESTORING THE KLAMATH
BASIN 35-37 (Univ. Cal. Press 2000) (discussing the Klamath area before white settlement)
[hereinafter BALANCING WATER].
6. Id. at 136.
7. Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (And Salmon) An Even Break: Klamath Basin
Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 202 (2002).
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The Upper Basin was one of the last areas of the Pacific
Northwest investigated by trappers 8 and opened to white settlement. 9 Its remote location initially allowed it to survive the first
waves of western settlement and “progress.” The rugged mountains of the Lower Basin ensured that downstream settlement
would be very modest, except at the mouth of the Klamath on the
Pacific Ocean. In Oregon, small-scale irrigation began in the late
nineteenth century and accelerated after the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902. 10 The Klamath was chosen as one the first
federal irrigation projects. 11 President Theodore Roosevelt overruled the engineers in the newly created Reclamation Service who
argued that federal funds should be targeted to the areas with the
best potential for irrigation and instead opted for a policy of the
geographical distribution of projects. 12 President Roosevelt opted
for distribution of reclamation throughout the West to help his
chances for reelection in 1904. 13 Hardy pioneers, including many
Czech immigrants fleeing the decaying Austro-Hungarian Empire,
eventually put some 400,000 acres under irrigation, about half
supplied by the federal Klamath Project. 14 The Upper Basin’s geographic history lives in place names like Tule Lake, although the
vast majority of the region’s wetlands were long ago drained and
converted to agriculture. 15
8. Peter Skene Odgen led the first trapper party into the area between 1826-1827.
See JEFF LALANDE, FIRST OVER THE SISKYOUS: PETER SKENE OGDEN’S 1826-1827 JOURNEY
THROUGH THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER (1987).
9. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 288.
10. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1902). For a detailed description and
history of the Klamath Project, see ERIC E. STENE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION HISTORY PROGRAM, THE KLAMATH PROJECT (1994), available at http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/
klamathh.html.
11. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL/CONFERENCE OPINION REGARDING
THE EFFECTS OF OPERATION OF THE U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S PROPOSED 10-YEAR
OPERATION PLAN FOR THE KLAMATH PROJECT AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ENDANGERED LOST
RIVER SUCKER (DELISTES LUXATUS), ENDANGERED SHORTNOSE SUCKER (CHAMISTES BREVIROSTRIS), THREATENED BALD EAGLE (HALIAEETUS LEUCOCEPHALUS) AND PROPOSED CRITICAL HABITAT FOR THE LOST RIVER AND SHORTNOSE SUCKERS 3 (2002) [hereinafter FWS 2002
BIOP], available at http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/docs/Final_Biological_Assessment_02-2502.pdf.
12. DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
1848-1902 312 (1992).
13. Id. The Clean Water Act similarly distributed sewage treatment grants, distributing the grants among the states regardless of the severity of pollution. 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (2006). Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security now showers high tech security around the country in areas of both high and low risk.
14. STENE, supra note 10.
15. Before white settlement, there were about 185,000 acres of wetlands in the basin;
today only 36,000 remain. ERNIE NIEMI, ET AL., ECONORTHWEST, COPING WITH COMPETITION FOR WATER: IRRIGATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE ECOSYSTEM IN THE UPPER
KLAMATH BASIN, 19 (2001) [hereinafter COPING WITH COMPETITION], available at
http://www.salmonandeconomy.org/pdf/KlamathWater.pdf.
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B. Ecosystem Restoration Proxies Emerge
As the Upper Basin was being drained, there were no strong
competing uses or opposing interests to “speak” for the ecosystem.
Nonetheless, for most of the past century, irrigation and the ecosystem were still able to coexist. For example, the Lost River and
shortnose suckers, as they are now known, once inhabited all the
major lakes of the Upper Basin and their tributaries, 16 supporting
multiple canneries. 17 These fish remained the target of a recreational as well as a tribal fishery until catches sharply declined in
the 1980s. 18 The decline continued even as the modern environmental movement laid the foundation for the appreciation of the
importance of maintaining ecosystem functions including endangered species conservation. More recently, we have come to recognize that ecosystems provide many valuable human services. 19
It has proved very difficult to translate this appreciation into
effective ecosystem conservation. In contrast to pollution and toxic
substances control, it has been much harder to conserve ecosystems and to maintain the services that they provide. Ecology’s insights came long after strong land and water legal entitlements or
political expectations evolved to support the maintenance of the
status quo, regardless of the environmental damage that it causes.
Thus, ecosystem services, as we now define them, are either provided by proxies or by new institutions, which are generally costly
because their provision must be overlaid by over-established exploitation regimes. In the West, the two existing proxies for ecosystem conservation and service provision to challenge the status
are wildlife refuges and Indian tribes who seek to maintain historic fisheries. Both were in place during the heyday of the Reclamation Era, but neither was powerful enough to resist the rise of
irrigation.
Before World War I, wildlife refuges were established in the
Upper Basin, but wildlife conservation was consistently subordinated to irrigation. 20 A proud local Indian tribe had inhabited the
area for over 14,000 years, but just as the Italians rejected the cold
northern Reformation devoid of pageantry and artistic splendor,
the Klamaths had no interest in the alien, white idea of irriga16. FWS 2002 BIOP, supra note 11, at 21.
17. See id. at 35.
18. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 53 Fed. Reg. 27130, 27131 (July
18, 1998).
19. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the conceptual foundations of ecosystem
service provision and the difference between conservation of ecosystem function and service
provision.
20. See Benson, supra note 7, at 205-06.
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tion. 21 The Klamath Indians were first put on a reservation and
then driven to the brink of extinction. During the tragedy of the
Eisenhower administration’s embrace of the idea of ultimate Indian assimilation into “white society” through reservation termination, the Klamath reservation was wiped off the map. 22 For most
of the twentieth century, the white irrigators were able to assume
that the basin’s limited supplies of water would be almost exclusively dedicated to irrigation in perpetuity regardless of the environmental and social costs. However, the changes in resource use
triggered by the environmental and Indian rights finally reached
the Basin by the 1980s, long after other areas of the west had begun to adjust to this paradigm shift.
C. Environmental Change Comes to the Klamath
The vehicles that brought environmentalism to the Basin and
continue to sustain it are the ESA and the Indian sovereignty
movement. 23 The Klamaths were eventually restored to tribal
status, 24 and the remnant Tribe supported the listing of the two
stressed suckers under the ESA. 25 During the 1990s, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) began to issue Biological Opinions suggesting that the basin’s main storage space, Klamath Lake, should be
maintained at high summer levels to support the two federally
listed fish. 26 Small percentage cutbacks and wet years avoided an
outright conflict between the ESA and irrigation until the drought
summer of 2001. 27 To comply with the ESA, the United States Bureau of Reclamation, which administers the Reclamation Act of
1902, 28 ordered the cutoff of ninety percent of normal deliveries to
the Klamath Project. 29 The Bureau took this drastic unprece21. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 296.
22. The story is briefly told in CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF
MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 120-121 (2005). See also THEODORE STERN, THE KLAMATH TRIBE:
A PEOPLE AND THEIR RESERVATION (Monograph 41 of the American Ethnological Society
1965)
23. Id. at 324-27.
24. Benson, supra note 7, at 203.
25. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Determination of Endangered
Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27130, 27131 (July 18,
1988).
26. Benson, supra note 7, at 218.
27. Between October 2000 and August 2001, the Basin received fifty-four percent of
its normal rainfall—6.93 compared to 13.05 inches. Michael Milstein, Clearing Up Water
Issues in the Klamath Basin, THE PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 29, 2001.
28. 32 STAT. 388 (1902) (presently codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
29. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, KLAMATH PROJECT 2001 OPERATIONS PLAN (Apr.
6, 2001).
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dented action in response to biological opinions issued by FWS and
NMFS which concluded that normal summer irrigation releases
would threaten the survival of the Lost River shortnose suckers,
bald eagles in Upper Klamath Lake, the project’s principal reservoir, and downstream Coho Salmon. 30 The potential of the ESA to
limit state water rights and federal contract entitlements in the
Upper Basin had long been anticipated, 31 especially in the
Klamath basin, but the 2001 summer irrigation season cutoff was
the first time that the Bureau had actually closed the headgates to
protect a listed species. 32 Things got worse. The summer of 2002
produced a large downstream salmon kill, and downstream, commercial, and recreational fishermen as well as several Tribes have
brought additional political and legal pressure to the Upper Basin. 33
Fallout was immediate and dramatic. In 2001, protests and a
brief outbreak of violence followed. 34 The Klamath became a Westwide—and even national—symbol of the clash between the virtuous, commodity-producing rural West and the economically irrational, illegitimate ESA supported only by “eco-radicals.” 35 In the
end, neither a new Sagebrush rebellion was triggered nor has the
ecosystem been stabilized. 36 Since the summer of 2001, cutoffs
have been avoided due to a combination of factors, including having wet years, a National Academy of Sciences study asserting
there was insufficient evidence to conclude the chosen lake levels
were necessary to protect the species in the stressed ecosystem, 37
and a revised Biological Opinion by the farmer friendly, environmentally hostile Bush II administration which spread ESA com30. The literature on the Klamath crisis in 2001is already substantial. See Benson,
supra note 7, for a history of the legal events that led to the 2001 shut down. Post 2001
events are analyzed in Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3; Marcilynn Burke, Klamath
Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why it
(Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y F. 441 (2004); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resources Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Science, Judgment, and Controversy].
31. See OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT, RESOLVING THE KLAMATH (1999),
available at http://www1.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/klamath_summary99.pdf.
32. The Bureau cut water deliveries in 1992 and 1994, but did not cut off all water
deliveries. Id. at 28.
33. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
34. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 321-23.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY (2003) [hereinafter ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES]. In June 2007, the Washington Post reported
that Vice President Richard Cheney initiated the NRC request, overruling the objections of
the former’s lobbyist that independent NRC panels were “a roll of the dice.” Jo Becker &
Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, THE WASHINGTON POST, Wednesday, June 27, 2007, at
A01.
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pliance duties over ten years. 38 A wide range of public and private
stakeholders have unsuccessfully tried to find a more permanent
solution to balance irrigation and ecosystem conservation, but the
underlying degradation is continuing and the “problem-shed” continues to expand. 39 Lower salmon fisheries have been severely
stressed by upstream water use and fishing communities have
been put at risk. 40
D. A Possible Role for Ecosystem Services
Since 2001, two resource use paradigms and the landscape visions that they support have competed for dominance in the
Klamath. The first is the continuation of the West as a commodity
production region. The second is a new West of urban archipelagoes, large biodiversity reserves, eco-tourism and “rationalized,”
sustainable agriculture. The first vision views the Klamath as an
irrigation district that must, at best, accommodate the “accident”
that it is also the habitat of several endangered species and the
spawning grounds for Coho Salmon, with the minimum disruption
of the status quo. The alternative vision is less clear because it
could range from an unrealistic pre-white settlement baseline to a
more realistic managed landscape that supports a wide range of
ecosystem services and limited agriculture focused on high-value
specialty crops.
These visions lie behind the strategies that all sides follow to
advance their interests. For environmentalists and salmon fisherman, the rigid enforcement of the ESA is the best way to force
the necessary changes in the basin. To irrigators, resistance to the
ESA and takings suits are the way to maintain the status quo.
Neither have moved the basin to a more sustainable landscape.
Therefore, the Klamath Basin would seem to be a good place to experiment with ecosystem services provisions, including provider
payments, as a way to reduce resource conflicts and reshape the
landscape.
This has not happened to date, although it could happen because ecosystems are hard to kill physically 41 and economic
38. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT:
THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED ACTIONS RELATED TO KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATION (APRIL 1,
2002 - MARCH 31, 2012) ON FEDERALLY-LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES 1
(Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT].
39. See Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 324-35.
40. Id. at 326.
41. The best example of a revived ecosystem is Mono Lake in California. The ecosystem was in danger of collapse from transbasin water diversions. Good scientific research,
litigation, and public monies have led to the increased tributary inflows which appear to
have stabilized the ecosystem. Jane Kay, Mono Lake Restoration: Water’s Arising, S.F.
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stresses are a force for change in the Basin. The Klamath is not
yet the United States’ Aral Sea. Upper Klamath Lake remains the
largest section of the wetlands in that region. 42 The lake is very
shallow, much like a marsh, averaging only between eight feet
deep when full and three feet deep during dry years. 43 In surface
area, it is the largest lake in Oregon 44 and is reportedly the largest
freshwater lake in the West. 45 Other large lakes and marshes remaining in the Upper Basin include Lower Klamath, Tule, and
Clear Lakes. 46 It is the law that makes ecosystems hard to restore. Upper Basin irrigators have been able to capture the right to
use most of the flow of the Klamath, and they are naturally reluctant to surrender these water rights or consider alternative landscape visions regardless of the environmental and social costs imposed on discrete downstream residents and society generally. 47
The case for a service provision experiment is strengthened by
the growing realization by all parties that it is unlikely that the
status quo can be maintained in the long run. Neither the status
quo nor a return to pre-white settlement conditions are ecologically, economically, and socially realistic. The Upper and Lower
Basins are dynamic eco- and social systems under stress from the
effects of Project and off-Project irrigation and market forces. 48
The ecosystem stresses include high background concentrations of
phosphorus and farming practices that use fertilizers, pesticides,
and manure from livestock operations that washes into the rivers
and lakes and causes eutrophication. 49 Upper Klamath Lake is
nutrient-rich, and its impaired water quality puts the endangered
fish at increased risk. 50 The operation of Link River Dam for hydropower generation also contributes to the stresses. 51 Ecological
CHRON., July 29, 2006 at A1. See generally Craig A. Arnold, Working Out an Environmental
Ethics: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 2004 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2004).
42. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 291.
43. Id.
44. Harry Carlson et al., Upper Klamath Basin Soil Resources, in WATER ALLOCATION
IN THE KLAMATH BASIN RECLAMATION PROJECT, 2001: AN ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCE, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 153 (Ore. St. Univ. 2001), available at
http://extension.oregonstate.edu/catalog/html/sr/sr1037/soil.pdf.
45. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5 at 26.
46. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 291.
47. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 340.
48. The Bureau takes the position that “the Project should not be responsible for effects
of all of the water development and land management activities throughout the Basin” on
endangered species. BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 38, at 2.
49. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES, supra note 37, at 102-22 (tracing out the
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric causes of lake pollution).
50. Id. at 122.
51. Despite its ownership of Link River Dam, the Bureau contends that it lacks the
authority to require PacifiCorp to install fish screens or take other measures to limit entrainment at the Dam. FWS 2002 BIOP, supra note 11 at 11.

Spring, 2007]

KLAMATH BASIN

215

stresses are compounded by economic ones. For example, the present owner of the utility that serves the project, PacifiCorp, has
announced it will not renew an earlier sweetheart deal between its
predecessor and the irrigators which provided cheap power rates. 52
Farmers, especially potato growers, find it hard to compete with
other states and global markets. 53 Finally, the specter of decreased winter snowpacks and decreased summer flows caused by
global climate change hangs over the entire region. 54
The Klamath is an ongoing story, and any analysis and conclusions must be discounted because the appropriate time horizon to
pass judgment is long. A Yurok fisherman summed it up when he
said of the possibility of a healthier river, “I may not see it, my dad
may not see it, . . . Hopefully it will help out my son further down
the road.” 55 This Article examines the case for ecosystem service
provision as a way to address the basin’s environmental problems
and explains why most of the incentives that exist in the Basin favor winner-take-all litigation and regulation as opposed to alternative strategies built around ecosystem service provision. The Article focuses on three service provision problems: (1) the geographic
scale of the ecosystem, (2) the pros and cons of using ESA litigation
as a catalyst to force change, and (3) the problems posed by the existence of entrenched entitlements. It concludes that the Klamath
requires both voluntary and mandatory land and water use practices which restore and conserve some measure of the traditional
ecosystem services 56 that watersheds long provided before they
were degraded through intensive development and commodity
production. However, to date, the Klamath story only explains
why ecosystem service provision institutions do not emerge while
partial, patchy regulatory ecosystem conservation experiments do.
52. PACIFIC POWER, KEEPING YOU INFORMED: UPDATE ON PACIFIC POWER RATE INCREASE REQUEST (May 9, 2006), available at http://www.pacificpower.net/File/File65387.pdf.
The decisions were upheld by the California and Oregon public utilities commissions. Proposed Decision, California PUC Docket No. 105-11-022, November 13, 2006, and Oregon
Public Utility Commission Docket No. UE-170, Order No. 06-172, April 12, 2006.
53. In 2000, potato farmers elected not to plant because they could not compete with
Idaho growers and world markets. Wendell Wood, We Should Stop Blaming Species for
Problems and Seek Real Solutions, KLAMATH FALLS HERALD AND NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001. The
Director of the Oregon Department of Agriculture expressed similar fears about the state’s
agricultural sectors that refuse to adapt to increased national and international competition. Kathy Coba, The First Year in Review, Address at the Eastern Oregon Forum (Feb. 11,
2004), available at http://egov.oregon.gov/ODA/do_speech_040211.shtml.
54. John M. Melack et al., Effects of Climate Change on Inland Waters of the Pacific
Coastal Mountains and Western Great Basin of North America, 11 HYDROLOGICAL PROCESSES 971, 973 (1997).
55. John Driscoll, Klamath Confluence, EUREKA TIMES-STANDARD, May 22, 2006,
available at http://www.klamathforestalliance.org/Newsarticles/newsarticle20060522.html.
56. See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870 (2005).
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Those trying to design more successful service provision experiments will have to work harder at overcoming the barriers found
in the Klamath and many other basins.
II. ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: THE WAY OF THE FUTURE?
A. The Ecosystem Service Idea
The scientific construct of the ecosystem is ecology’s most important contribution to environmental protection, but it has proved
difficult to implement the teachings of ecology in part because
ecology continually evolves. The original idea that natural systems should be walled off to the maximum extent possible from
human intrusion to conserve their inherent stability has given way
to a more complicated understanding of ecosystems as dynamic
systems responding to stresses and changing over time. Modern
ecology now views ecosystems as dynamic, complex systems continually adapting to change and stress. 57 Ecosystems are neither
stable nor chaotic, but continue to evolve at different rates over
different spacial scales. The rate of change is not continuous, and
systems can display equilibria states for long periods of time but
then collapse, and cascading change can occur. 58
This vision has sparked a debate about whether society should
actively and adaptively manage ecosystems for their functions or
services or some combination of both. Ecosystem function and services are related but are analytically different. Ecosystem function
refers to the various physical processes that ecosystems perform.
Ecosystem services refers to those functions that provide concrete,
monitizeable benefits to human welfare. 59 However, in practice,
the line between function and service is hazy, especially since we
tend to address the issue of ecosystem conservation through imperfect proxies that do not make a clear function-service distinction.
The focus on the role that ecosystems play in providing useful
57. See C.F. Hollings & Lance H. Gunderson, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive
Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 1-23 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002) (discussing a series of ecosystem
changes).
58. C.F. Hollings et el., Sustainability and Panarachies, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 72-77 (2002).
59. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, for example, posits four categories of
services: (1) the provision of food and water, (2) the regulation or prevention of adverse impacts such as disease, (3) support for other production activities, and (4) cultural services
such as recreation. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS:
NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 7 (2005) [hereinafter LIVING BEYOND OUR
MEANS], available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.429.aspx.
pdf.
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services to humans reflects two powerful recent trends. First, the
emphasis on lost ecosystem services reflects the rise of biodiversity
as an organizing concept for a variety of uncoordinated resource
management objectives. 60 Biodiversity conservation requires that
ecosystems be viewed as a functioning unit rather than a discrete
collection of species. Put differently, all species and the natural
processes that support them are potentially equally important. 61
Second, the ultra-utilitarian rationale for ecosystem and biodiversity protection reflects the capture of much of the environmental
policy discourse by science and welfare economics. 62
This said, the question becomes: Does ecosystem service provision offer positive advantages in areas such as the Klamath compared to the current litigation-regulation strategies that are being
followed? 63 Much energy has been devoted to the development of
environmental ethics, but the strongest case for environmental
protection remains the ability to show that protection can be justified by hard numbers. 64 Science-based, utilitarian solutions have
the potential to appeal to a wide variety of interests. They are less
polarizing than appeals to higher spiritual and aesthetic values.
Despite heroic efforts to create a workable system of environmental ethics that encompasses non-humans, environmental protection remains relentlessly anthropocentric. It is also harder to
argue against a policy with dollar values attached. Finally, because ecosystem service provision is either tied to a market or to
government subsidies, it can be a fair and equitable way of reallocating resources. The problem has been to apply these diverse rationales from concept to the working landscape.
The ultimate issue in the Klamath is whether it is possible to
move to an alternative, sustainable landscape with a mix of agriculture and the enhanced maintenance and restoration 65 of impor60. See DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE (Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1996), for an informative history of the construction of the term. A
recent United Nations report links biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services. LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS, supra note 59, at 12.
61. For a masterful analysis of the unanswered scientific questions that the construct
raises, see Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 364 (2004)
62. For the best example of this capture, see LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS, supra note
59.
63. There are, of course, risks to this approach. See Dale Goble, What are Slugs Good
for? Ecosystem Services and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
415 (2007), (cautioning against shifting the focus from the scientific, non-utilitarian ethical
concern with ecosystem function to the relentlessly utilitarian focus on ecosystem service
provision).
64. See Science, Judgment, and Controversy, supra note 30. The counter position is
well-articulated by Professor Mark Sagoff, Price, Principle, and the Environment 135-144
(2004)
65. The need to focus on restoration strategies is forcefully argued in Debra Donahue
Federal Rangeland Policy: Perverting Law and Jeopardizing Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND
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tant ecosystem functions and services. One solution is a mix of induced and mandated conservation practices combined with the
“post-modern” concept of ecosystem service markets. Federal and
state requirements dealing with pollution control and resource
conservation could work together toward that goal supplemented
by NGO participation. However, there has been little consideration of the quantification and commodification of ecosystem services as a long term solution in the Klamath. There are many sincere and hopeful peacemakers at work, but the focus remains on
maintaining the traditional white irrigation culture to the maximum extent possible.
B. From Theory to Action: Some Hard Questions
The Klamath illustrates three of the central meta problems
with efforts to shift traditional resource exploitationenvironmental protection debates to ecosystem services conservation options. First, the resource exploitation legacy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries stack the deck in favor of the preservation of the status quo. 66 Second, the use of a single powerful
law such as the ESA to change the status quo can, perversely, shift
the focus from ecosystem function and service conservation to
adoption of only minimal mitigation measures to save a species
from extinction or to push the problem forward a few years. Third,
the Klamath is, in effect, a heritage area. The benefits of ecosystem service generation are national, if not global. However, the
public and private service providers are disconnected from the
beneficiaries.
To overcome these barriers, three hard problems which often
arise when one tries to develop a landscape strategy for an area
that restores a level of lost ecosystem services must be addressed. 67
USE & ENVTL. L. 301 (2007).
66. The reasons include the existence of entrenched property rights and cultural attitudes that discourage interest in new, cooperative management schemes, especially where
endangered species are present. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and
Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423 (2003).
67. This Article does not address the question of the optimal institutional mix to provide ecosystem services. Since Secretary Bruce Babbitt’s tenure as Secretary of the Interior,
there has been a movement to solve ecosystem problems by ad hoc public-private stakeholder processes. Professors Jody Freeman and Daniel A. Farber call this development
modular regulation. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation,
54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005). For a more skeptical but ultimately hopeful view see Peter M.
Lavigne, The Movement for American Ecosystem Restoration and Interactive Environmental
Decisionmaking: Quagmire, Diversion, or Our Last, Best Hope?, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1
(2003).
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(1) What is the geographic extent of the ecosystem
and how does its scope and scale impact the incentives and disincentives to provide ecosystem services? The Klamath’s two basins create a great disparity between those who enjoy ecosystem benefits
and those with the power to degrade them.
(2) Do environmental and resource management
laws help or hinder efforts to make ecosystem provision an integral part of a landscape conservation
plan? For example, the ESA has been hailed as having the power to induce long term changes in public
and private behavior. The Klamath experience, however, suggests that the focus on listed species widens
the disconnect between the ESA and existing state
water law entitlements. Because the reallocation of
water is vital to ecosystem service provision, the limited ability of the Act to change long-established water allocation patterns is troubling.
(3) Is a “Coasian” solution always possible or must
there be a reassignment of property rights? The
widespread assumption in the ecosystem service literature is that equity and efficiency counsel “bribing” existing entitlement holders to provide the necessary services. 68 In the Klamath Basin, the law of
prior appropriation and federal reclamation stack
the deck in favor of irrigators and against either existing ecosystem service providers or the emergence
of new ones, 69 thus effectively shifting the cost of
water conservation to federal tax payers. Put differently, there is a potential moral hazard problem. The
law rewards, rather than penalizes, resource use
patterns with high social costs.
III. GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE MATTERS
A. The Physical Features of the Klamath Basin
Before the service provision issues can be addressed, the “prob68. See infra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
69. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 339-40.
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lemshed” must be delineated. The geographic scale of the ecosystem influences the barriers and incentives to service provision. For
aquatic ecosystem problems, the river basin is the presumptive
geographic area. However, the practice of good geography may
only exacerbate the problem. The presumption holds in the
Klamath, although the Basin is actually two equally sized subbasins each with a different geography, culture, and economy. Nature flipped the usual pattern; the Upper Basin is relatively flat
and dry and the Lower steep and wet. The Klamath watershed
covers a vast, sparsely populated, remote region in south central
Oregon and extreme northern California. 70 This area is much
poorer than the urban and exurban areas of these two prime examples of successful post-industrial states. 71 The river originates
in Upper Klamath Lake, a broad, shallow lake fed by snow melt
from the Cascade Mountains of Oregon, and flows through the
Trinity Alps of California, where the Scott, Trinity, and Salmon
Rivers join it, before it reaches the Pacific Ocean at the Redwood
National Park. 72
The Upper Basin, often referred to simply as the Klamath Basin, is the site of the conflicts of 2001. 73 It spans across the California-Oregon border 74 and has long been dedicated to irrigated
agriculture—primarily potatoes, specialty crops and hay. 75 It includes high peaks in the Cascade Mountains that receive more
than forty inches of precipitation annually. 76 But, “its dominant
feature is a flat, agricultural valley lying just west of the ridge that
marks the beginning of the forbiddingly arid Great Basin.” 77 Only
about eleven inches of rain fall in the valley each year, making it
nearly a desert, and water demand exceeds supply about seven out
of every ten years. 78 Agriculture is made even more challenging by
the area’s high elevation and short growing season. Because of the
severe climatic conditions, none of the lands in the region fall in
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s highest productivity class
(Class I). 79
The Lower Klamath Basin, lying entirely in California, is
70. Id. at 289.
71. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 295.
72. Id. at 289.
73. Id.at 291.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 299.
76. Id. at 291.
77. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 291.
78. Agriculture is the only important consumptive use of water in the Basin, accounting
for more than 95 percent of the consumptive use. See BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 38, at 25.
79. Carlson, supra note 44, at 156.
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dominated by timber-covered slopes and mountainous wilderness
areas. 80 The Lower Klamath River and its tributaries were once
teeming with Coho and Chinook Salmon, 81 allowing the Indians
along the river to harvest a million pounds annually. 82 Wild Chinook are considered superior to farm-raised salmon because of its
taste and heart-healthy oils. Like many headwaters areas, the
Upper Basin was able to put the waters to beneficial use before
other claims emerged, thereby exporting some of the external costs
of this allocation downstream. Salmon runs are threatened by the
lack of water and other non-anthropocentric factors. 83
Commercial harvest began in the early 1800s and continued
until the mid-1990s, when the severely declining Coho fisheries
were essentially closed. 84 Coho populations fell from a range of
50,000 to 125,000 in the 1940s to 6,000 fish in 1996. 85 Recreational harvest of Coho Salmon in the Klamath River and its tributaries continued until the Coho were listed under the federal ESA
in 1997. A small tribal Coho harvest, affecting about seventy
naturally spawning fish per year, remains. 86 Salmon conditions
have deteriorated since 2001. There was a major die off in 2002, 87
and in 2006 the anticipation of low Klamath fall Chinook runs resulted in sharp reduction in the allowable catch of the Pacific
Coast salmon fishery in Oregon and California. 88
B. The Geography of Interests
The ability of upstream irrigators to shift costs downstream
80. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 289.
81. Id. The Klamath Basin was “the third most important salmon producing river
system in the nation, producing an estimated 660,000 to 1,100,000 million [sic] adult fish
annually.” Water Management and Endangered Species Issues in the Klamath Basin: Oversight Field Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Resources, 107th Cong. 123 (2001) (statement
of William F. “Zeke” Grader, Jr., Executive Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations).
82. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 35.
83. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES, supra note 37, at 102-22.
84. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon / Northern California Coast Evolutionarily
Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24588, 24593-94 (May 6, 1997). NMFS
regulations allow incidental take of Coho in Chinook-directed fisheries off California consistent with Pacific Fishery Management Council regulations. See 50 C.F.R. § 223.204. Coho
are not to be retained, but are impacted by “hook and release.” NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SVC., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATIONS 29 (May 31, 2002) [hereinafter
NMFS 2002 BIOP] available at http://swr.nmfs.noaa.gov/psd/Klamath/KpopBO2002finalMay
31.pdf.
85. Mary Christina Wood, Restoring the Abundant Trust: Tribal Litigation in Pacific
Northwest Salmon Recovery, 36 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10163, 10164 (2006).
86. NMFS 2002 BIOP, supra note 84, at 29.
87. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 335.
88. Fisheries Off West Coast States; West Coast Salmon Fisheries; 2006 Management
Measure and a Temporary Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 26254-66 (May 4, 2006).
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illustrates the problem with moving toward an ecosystem services
provision remedy when the most immediate beneficiaries of ecosystem services are located far from the origin of the service. Upper
Basin irrigators have no incentive to provide the services unless
compelled by the ESA, and downstream fishing communities have
no incentive to share the cost of service provision. Shallow upper
Klamath Lake is the irrigator carry-over storage reservoir, but
there is little reserve water to release in a drought. Therefore, at
least in the eyes of the lower basin, the geography of the Klamath
creates two classes of parties: “tort feasors” and “victims.” 89 The
“tort feasors” are the Klamath irrigators, who have shifted the external costs of irrigation downstream, and the “victims” are downstream tribes as well as commercial and recreational salmon fisherman, since lowered flows impair salmon runs. This perception
creates an incentive for “victims” to rely on litigation-regulatory
solutions: full enforcement of the ESA, which in effect shifts the
provision burdens back to the upstream irrigators who try to shift
it to the federal tax payers. 90 Either irrigation deliveries must be
cut or a federally financed water bank must provide the necessary
water. 91 The next section addresses the potential of the ESA to
overcome these barriers.
IV. THE PROS AND CONS OF UNLEASHING THE ESA PIT BULL
A. The Catalyst Theory of the ESA
Three decades ago, Professor George Coggins described the
89. I am not asserting that upper stream irrigators are necessarily liable under common law tort doctrines such as nuisance. These issues are fully addressed in J.B. Ruhl, The
“Background Principles” of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services — Did Lucas Open
Pandora’s Box?, 22 J. LAND USE & EVNTL. L. 527 (2007). I am borrowing the analysis developed by Judge Guido Calabresi, illustrating that the fault system makes liability decisions
on an “all-or-nothing basis” and makes it difficult to allocate costs efficiency. GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 239-43 (Yale Univ.
Press 1970).
90. Both irrigators and fisherman have received emergency relief. The Oregon Natural Resources Council put the 2001 disaster relief for the irrigators at $48,625,000.00.
JAMES MCCARTHY, OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL, CRISIS PROFITEERING: INEQUIEXCESSES OF KLAMATH PROJECT BAILOUT (2001), available at
TIES
AND
http://www.klamathbasin.info/CrisisProfiteering.pdf. After the virtual closure of the 2006
Pacific fishing season, fishermen demanded $81 million, but Congress only authorized the
release of $2 million from a NOAA emergency fund. David Whitney, House OKs $2 Million
in Disaster Aid for Salmon Fleet, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 29, 2006, at A3.
91. Starting in 2002, the Bureau of Reclamation created a water bank in the Upper
Basin to met downstream flow obligations. Sufficient water was provided but the Bureau
cannot quantify the actual impacts. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
(GAO), KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: RECLAMATION MET ITS WATER BANK OBLIGATIONS, BUT INFORMATION PROVIDED TO WATER BANK STAKEHOLDERS COULD BE IMPROVED (March 2005)
[hereinafter GAO].
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ESA as “one of the few nearly absolute standards governing management of the American natural legacy.” 92 Among environmental
statutes, the ESA is relatively unique because it contains substantive as well as procedural mandates. In practice, the ESA is much
less draconian than its friends and opponents portray it. The two
agencies that administer the ESA have turned it into a more userfriendly development permit program. In the majority of cases the
focus is on mitigation and the use of habitat conservation plans to
allow the killing of a percentage of listed species. Nonetheless,
proponents of species protection and ecosystem conservation support the use of aggressive ESA litigation as a catalyst to trigger
more comprehensive long range solutions. One strategy is to trigger the Section 7 consultation process in the hopes that stringent
enforcement (or the threat of it) will produce a better result for the
species and its habitat ecosystem. 93 Federal agencies who propose
actions that may place listed species at risk must consult with either the FWS or the NMFS. These agencies issue a Biological
Opinion (BiOp), which determines whether the action poses a risk
to a listed species and outlines the necessary avoidance measures.
An unfavorable BiOp, such as the 2001 Klamath BiOp, triggers the
duty to ensure that the action “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of the species. 94
There are two ecosystem service justifications for ESA catalyst
or “rule of law” litigation, that the use of litigation to create a crisis
that will produce a long run solution for the ecosystem. 95 First, it
can target the optimal or most efficient service provider. Second, if
you adopt the “tort feasor”-”victim” approach, the ESA can trigger
solutions that are fair, that go beyond the narrow mandates of the
statute, and that are systemwide. The Klamath Project irrigators
may be the cheapest cost avoiders because they can cut back production in water during short years and take other adaptive measures. 96 Neither salmon nor Indian fishermen have the same range
92. George Cameron Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in
Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433,1435 (1982).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
95. The environmental movement began in large part as a legal guerilla movement
and non-governmental organizations pursued the strategy of asking courts to construct
strict statutes that imposed substantive and procedural duties that could be characterized
as environmental. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002).
96. In the United States, we still view natural disasters such as drought as beyond
the control of the victims and thus worthy of government relief. Australia has started, with
some backsliding in the severe drought that began in this century, on a different course.
Australian drought policy is premised on the assumption that drought is an expected occurrence in the world’s driest climate and thus farmers should take proactive steps to anticipate it and to mitigate the risks. See BEYOND DROUGHT: PEOPLE, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES
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of avoidance options. Putting the service provision cost on irrigators can also be characterized as an example of the “polluter pays”
principle at work. For years, the irrigators were able to shift the
external costs of their water use to others, so it is only fair that
they now internalize a portion of these costs.
The fear of strict enforcement has triggered some very creative
solutions, such as multi-species habitat conservation plans in
which the burdens of species conservation are widely shared between public and private providers. 97 However, in the Klamath,
the ESA has frustrated efforts to develop a basin-wide solution in
the Upper Basin by focusing on only one class of tort feasors—the
federal irrigators. Without a federal nexus, all irrigation operations can only be addressed through section 9, which prohibits any
person from “taking” a listed species. 98 Enforcement would require
FWS or NMFS to prove that the actions of a specific entity (an individual farmer or irrigation district) caused the take of a listed
fish—a showing that can be difficult to make. In contrast, the use
of the Section 7 procedure makes it much easier to look to Project
irrigators than to non-Project irrigators to bear the costs of protecting the endangered fish. However, it is easy to see why Project irrigators (and the agency that serves them—the Bureau) would feel
unfairly targeted by any increased burdens in light of a century of
undisturbed access to water. The result in the Klamath has been
BiOps that leave protection of the listed species in doubt because
of reluctance to impose inequitable burdens on Project irrigators.
In short, the catalyst theory does not appear to have yet
worked in the Klamath despite many good faith efforts to make it
happen. Writing after the drought summer of 2001, Professor
Holly Doremus and I concluded:
The Klamath experience . . . confirms the disconnect
(2003).
97. The habitat conservation plan process remains controversial and there are many
problems with it. My point is only that fear of ESA enforcement provided the incentive for
ecosystem conservation experiments that go far beyond the requirements of the ESA. Compare Lindell Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Paradigm for Conserving Biodiversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1994), and Marc Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1997), and Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000), and A. Dan
Tarlock, THE DYNAMIC URBAN LANDSCAPE IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT 30 127 (2006),
with Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592 (1999), and Karen Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 279 (1998).
98. A taking includes habitat modification, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), including water withdrawals. United
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
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between the ESA and state water law, and the Act’s
limited ability to change long-established water allocation patterns. The NMFS 2002 Biological Opinion
makes a commendable stab at broadening the vision
of responsibility for improving the Klamath’s ecological condition by calling for initiation of a
state/federal process to identify non-project water
that could contribute to flows needed by the coho.
But that effort, which does not go nearly as far as is
needed, seems doomed to failure unless the state
chooses to cooperate. The Bureau, the target of
NMFS’ requirement, has no authority to demand
state, or even other federal agency, participation in
any such process, much less to demand any particular substantive outcome.
To date the Klamath experience suggests
that, at best, the ESA is an uneven, weak catalyst.
In Oregon, resistance to those changes continues. In
the spring of 2002, a coalition of environmental
groups submitted a petition asking the Oregon Water Resources Commission to place a moratorium on
new appropriations on the Klamath and Lost Rivers.
Given the recent water conflicts in the basin, the ongoing adjudication, and the fact that no new flow
appropriations have been granted since 1997, that
seemed a relatively mild request. The Commission,
however, with the support of the agricultural community, rejected the petition. 99
B. Counter-Culture Reactions
Subsequent events have largely tended to confirm our analysis
and to reveal a number of specific problems with catalyst litigation. Four developments stand out. The first is a hardening of the
position by those who want to maintain the status quo and a consequent unwillingness to compromise. The second, which is a
symptom of the first, is the use of a counter catalyst. The third is
that the focus on legal and regulatory solutions create disincentives to seek alternative, longer-lasting solutions to the problem.
The final development is the ease with which strict enforcement of
the ESA can be avoided. This problem is discussed in Section V of
this Article. This Section focuses on the second and third prob99. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 348-49 (citations omitted).
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lems.
Rule of law litigation is a game that anyone can play, and the
Klamath irrigators, emboldened by a Supreme Court decision that
allowed them to challenge Biological Opinions 100 and the 20022003 National Research Council Reports, tried to land a knock-out
punch. To wipe out the successful ESA cases which held that the
existence of vested state water rights was not a defense to compliance with the ESA, the irrigators tried to ride the current property
rights wave and brought a Court of Claims Fifth Amendment takings suit for more than a billion dollars. 101 However, this move did
not succeed. The court found that the federal government had appropriated all of the non-appropriated waters in the basin for the
Project and that the individual farmers only had contract rights,
rather than property rights. It refused to follow an earlier case 102
that had found a physical taking. 103 Specifically, the court noted
that many Reclamation contracts, including those in the Klamath,
absolved the government of liability for “water shortages—
hydrologic, regulatory, or hybrid—that may occur within the system.” 104 It also suggested that even if the contracts did not specifically provide for delivery interruptions, the ESA could be characterized as a sovereign act which overrode the Bureau’s Reclamation Act duties. The court remanded for proceedings on contract
claims, but the court again ruled against the irrigators. 105
The third reason recognizes that the regulatory system offers
such powerful advantages to both sides and thus crowds out the
search for alternative solutions. In a recent paper, a group of researchers studied the failure of a voluntary watershed planning
process, cemented by compliance social norms rather than legal
duties, to emerge on the an Illinois river. Building on the foundation work of Elinor Ostrom, which challenges the assumption that
private commons management is always tragic, 106 they concluded
that the enforcement or threat of enforcement of stringent resource
100. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997). In holding that the ESA citizen suit
provisions applied to opponents of species conservation, Justice Scalia unilaterally rewrote
the legislative history of the ESA with his incredible statement that the primary purpose of
the Act was “to avoid needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously
but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives.” Id. at 176-77.
101. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 67 F.Cl.
504 (2005).
102. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.Cl. 313, 317 (2001).
103. Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 537.
104. Id. at 535 (quoting Brian Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2002)).
105. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007)
106. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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management laws can crowd out other regimes by transferring
power to progressively higher levels:
Underneath and alongside . . . formal governing bodies, numerous formal and informal institutions of
“civil society,” ranging from state-chartered corporations and organizations to customary associations
and social orderings have more-or-less formalized
rules governing their behaviors. In a locality such as
the Cache, where many individuals live within
widely ramifying sets of kin and other long-standing,
multi-generational relations, these informal governing rules often override formal laws. The overlapping jurisdictions of formal and informal institutions
create a governing terrain in which “custom” can be
as significant as formal procedures. 107
It may nonetheless be premature to write off the catalyst theory. Despite the Bush Administration’s efforts to defang the ESA,
it retains vigor. Downstream fishermen have been able to use the
ESA to successfully challenge the Bush Administration’s efforts to
push forward all serious compliance with Biological Opinions that
require water cutoffs. 108 In 2006, a federal district court held that
the Bureau of Reclamation had to release water, at the expense of
the project, to support threatened Coho in the Lower Basin. 109

107. Adams, Jane et al., Watershed Planning: Pseudo-democracy and its Alternatives —
The Case of the Cache River Watershed, Illinois, 22 AGRIC. AND HUMAN VALUES 327, 332
(2005).
108. See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
109. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 WL
798920 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the Bureau’s release
plan (or non-plan) was arbitrary. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). The Bureau practically guaranteed the result
by adopting a Biological Opinion in 2002 which phased in downstream protection over ten
years and delayed the provision of the full amount of water necessary to protect the Coho
until year nine. BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 39. The court easily
found that the BiOp failed to analyze adequately the impact of the effect of the delay on the
Coho in years one through eight. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 426 F.3d at 1090.
In short, it carried its own “death wound” by adopting policies that it could not support with
credible science. The injunction was upheld in Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 226 Fed. Appx. 715 (9th Cir. 2007). The years of litigation that led
to this decision are set out in Wood, supra note 53.
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V. COASE IN THE KLAMATH OR PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSIGNMENTS
ALSO MATTER
A. The Necessity for Property Rights
Ecosystem services require the creation of new property rights.
The Klamath is an ecosystem in which long-established property
rights, primarily water rights, reenforce resistance to fundamental
change. This Section addresses the question of how existing property rights can facilitate or hinder the necessary changes in the
system. In theory, the existence of entrenched property rights is
no stranger to efficient change. Ronald Coase received the Nobel
Prize in economics for his article The Problem of Social Cost. 110
Coase’s theorem posits that, absent transaction costs, parties will
bargain toward an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the
initial allocation of property rights. Critics have long pointed out
that a world of zero or minimal transaction costs seldom exists and
that the initial assignment of rights can strongly influence the reallocation options. This section argues that when private providers are involved, the level of service provision, if any, is a partial
function of the property entitlement claimed by the presumptive
provider. The more entrenched the initial entitlement, the more
pressure there will be for both forced reallocations and bribes. 111
Proponents of a Coasian solution must take full account of the loss
of power and self-esteem that all change, forced or compensated,
brings. The situation for public providers is different; public ownership often carries with it the discretion, but seldom the duty, to
dedicate land and water to ecosystem provision. Thus, the result
is often the same: the under-provision of ecosystem services because of the power of entrenched private entitlements and expectations that public resources will be dedicated to commodity production.
A necessary condition for the provision of ecosystem services is
the existence of a defined, consistent provider. Proponents of service provision would prefer that a beneficiary also be identified and
that the two be linked through markets. However, providers can
provide services as a bi-product of other activities either because
they are forced to or because they are bribed to so. Thus, the class
of beneficiaries can be an identifiable group or society at large.
Once the provider is identified, the question turns to the relationship between property rights and ecosystem service provision. The
110. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
111. I use “bribe” in the classic economics sense: a person changes his or her behavior in
response to a legal payment of money.
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root of the problem is that the relationship is often negative because private entitlements are difficult to modify even when
money may be available to do so.
B. Property Rights in the Klamath: Entrenched Entitlements
Resist Change
Western national resources law has a fundamental bias toward
resource exploitation, and the legislative process has generally operated, at least until recently, to reinforce the expectation that
there will be few limits on exploitation. Western water law is a
prime example, as it is a product of the legacy of late Roman legal
thought. The modern notion of property remains rooted in the
Roman notion of exclusive dominion subject only to the duty not to
cause a nuisance. For example, this view lies behind the Supreme
Court’s dismissal of the argument that the purchaser of highly
regulated wetland property assumes the risk of a development denial with the quip that “[T]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.” 112 Locke himself might be
surprised that his labor theory has now incorporated the Roman
right of ius abutendi, the right to destroy property. Both the common law and the police power temper this discretion, but this legacy has made it much harder to limit activities that degrade ecosystems as opposed to the limitation of air, soil, and water as
waste disposal sinks.
The combination of legal entitlements backed by the political
process is at work in the Klamath to maintain the status quo. The
irrigators, supported by the Bureau of Reclamation, claim the right
to apply water without regard to the environmental costs. They
rely on the doctrine of prior appropriation, which is a practical, intuitive response to the seasonable unreliability of western water
supplies. Miners developed the custom of allocating rights by priority rather than trying to use the vague equal sharing rules of the
common law of riparian rights. Courts sanctioned this custom as
an acceptable risk distribution scheme for the arid west, 113 but the
112. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). Professor J.B. Ruhl partially
disagrees with this analysis and argues that the common law has the potential to adapt
over a long period of time to recognize a duty of ecosystem provision. J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E.
KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, 266-271
(2007). See Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. 2006), the Supreme
Court’s decision on remand, which held that the state could deny the permit because draining and filling would be a nuisance.
113. For example, at a time when the public use doctrine limited the exercise of the
power of eminent domain to property which would be used by the public, the Supreme Court
upheld a Utah statute allowing appropriators to condemn ditch right of ways across private
lands because of “some peculiar condition of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the
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rhetoric of Western water law has obscured the high level of risks
inherent in prior appropriation and instead has stressed the illusory firmness of water rights. The Reclamation Era was premised
on the expectation that federal government would eliminate most
risk or recurring periods of drought and highly variable rainfall
patterns by carry-over storage. Dams and reservoirs reduced but
did not eliminate risk. Because risk is inherent in water entitlements, there should be no inherent legal barriers to management
solutions that equitably reassign the risks of water shortages to
accommodate all relevant uses and stakeholders in a basin and
enhance the provision of ecosystem services. 114 The federal reclamation program’s construction of carry-over storage reservoirs to
back-stop water rights—not the law—is the main reason that water rights are relatively firm regardless of the water year. Thus, it
has proved very difficult to add new risks to Western water rights.
C. Ecosystem Service Property Rights
There are three counter strategies to the drag of existing entitlements: (1) environmental group property rights, (2) forced reallocation through the ESA, and (3) bribes.
1. Public and Group Environmental Property Rights
Two federal property rights exist in the Klamath that could potentially be dedicated to ecosystem provision and offset the effects
of irrigation. Both the Upper Basin’s wildlife refuges and the
Klamath Tribe can claim water rights that can be dedicated to service provision, but the potential of these rights to provide consistent long term, ecosystem services is limited. Due to the fact that
western settlement preceded effective federal control over the pubstate . . . .” Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905).
114. The California Supreme Court has recently sanctioned a new risk-based law of
flood control liability. Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water District, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (1997),
holds that a public entity which diverts water from a natural watercourse that has historically flooded adjacent lands and constructs flood control works that fail in a major rain
event is only liable if it acted unreasonably in designing, constructing and operating the
project.
[T]he only way to determine whether a damaged private landowner has .
. . been forced to contribute a compensable “disproportionate” share of
the public undertaking is to determine whether the system, as designed,
constructed, and operated and maintained, exposed him to an “unreasonable” risk of harm, either individually or in relation to other landowners.
Id. at 100-01.
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lic domain, states gained the power to allocate water in the west
and have long claimed that this historical accident excludes federal
control. There is no constitutional basis for this claim; it rests entirely on Congressional forbearance and this has been eroded over
time. 115
Three twentieth century historical moments have restored a
measure of federal power under the Commerce and Property powers: the conservation movement, tribal sovereignty, and the environmental movement. First, the conservation era first produced a
special class of federal water rights for Indian tribes and public
land withdrawals. These are mixed riparian and appropriative
rights. A federal reserved right has a priority date, but unlike an
appropriative right, it need not be put to beneficial use to be perfected. Like a riparian right, it can be claimed at any time and can
encompass ecosystem conservation, at least for the maintenance or
revival of historic fisheries. But federal claims remain limited in
scope and quantity and are seldom robust enough to support the
desired range of ecosystem services.
Until the 1963 decision in Arizona v. California, 116 Westerners
assumed that only Indians had federal water rights. In the epic
litigation to divide the Lower Colorado River, the Supreme Court
held that the federal government can claim non-Indian federal reserved rights to fulfill the purposes of a public land withdrawal. 117
Arizona v. California and a subsequent case initially took an expansive view of reserved rights. 118 They could be implied to fulfill
the purpose of a reservation. However, this view did not survive.
In United States v. New Mexico, 119 the Supreme Court limited implied public land rights to the minimum amount necessary to fulfill the primary (not secondary) purposes of the reservation and
made it extremely difficult for the public land agencies to obtain a
fraction of the water they need to manage public lands consistent
with the expanded ecosystem conservation mandates of Congress.
The Forest Service claimed instream flows for a wilderness area,
but the majority reasoned that the 1897 Organic Act limited the
purpose of national forests to “securing favorable conditions of water flows” for downstream irrigators and cities and “furnish[ing] a
115. California Oregon Power v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64
(1935) (three Congressional Acts severed western waters from the public lands and made
them “subject to the plenary control of the designated states”).
116. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
117. Id. at 597-98.
118. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
119. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The definitive history of the litigation is discussed in G. Emlen
Hall, The Forest Service and Western Water Rights: An Intimate Portrait of United States v.
New Mexico, 45 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 979 (2006).

232

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 22.2

continuous supply of timber.” 120 The court subsequently held that
both Indian and Non-Indian federal reserved water rights could be
adjudicated in the state court General Adjudications, but the
states had to apply federal standards. The net result is that New
Mexico has made it difficult but not impossible for the federal government to assert non-Indian reserved water rights for public
lands withdrawals. For example, after the case, the Forest Service
tried to assert reserved rights for sediment transport. A Federal
District Court agreed that stream integrity was a favorable condition, but held that the flows were not necessary to support this hydrologic function. The federal government has filed many public
land claims as well as instream flow claims under state law. In
Colorado and Idaho, the Forest Service encountered a Catch 22:
state instream flow rights can only be held by a state agency. 121 In
addition, Idaho has developed a substantial anti-federal reserved
rights jurisprudence for wildlife refuges based on the court’s “reading” of history. 122 The federal government has fared better in Oregon, but it has not been able to reverse the years of the subordination of the refuges to irrigation.
a. Klamath Wildlife Refuge Rights
The refuges are wetlands depending on water to survive and
can claim federal water rights, but water law has long split water
from land and limited the ability of the federal government to
claim water rights for public lands. For years the refuges’ water
flow was under the control of irrigators; the refuges got return
flows and any water not needed for irrigation. For example, water
has been delivered to the Klamath National Wildlife Refuge, but it
has always been the lowest delivery priority so it often receives
only polluted agricultural waste water.
Wildlife refuges are a category of public land withdrawal which
falls between the limited use mandates that characterize (or once
120. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714.
121. In re Matter of the Amended Applications of the United States for Reserved Rights
in the Platte River, Case No. W-8439-76 (Feb. 12, 1993). See Teresa Rice, Colorado Water
Court Denies Reserved Rights Claims for Channel Maintenance, 4 RIVERS 146 (1993) (no
longer published).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Idaho, 23 P.3d 117, 128-29 (Idaho 2001) (finding it “inconceivable” that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would give preference to waterfowl over
irrigation when he created a wildlife refuge in the Snake River island in 1937, in the midst
of the dust bowl); Potlatch v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1268 (Idaho 2000) (reserved
rights do not attach to wilderness areas; Wilderness Act does not protect watersheds because Senator Frank Church, D-Idaho, would have never voted for the Act because recognition of such rights would cripple economic growth in Idaho). Wyoming has a similar tradition. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System (Big Horn III), 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
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did) the national park system and the expansive, open-ended multiple use management mandates of withdrawals such as forests
and grazing lands. 123 They grew in an uncoordinated fashion by
the creation of individual areas. Refuges management has steadily
evolved toward ecosystem conservation, but it took decades for this
view to crystallize and, thus, multiple use philosophy has dominated thinking about refuges until recently. A comprehensive organic act was not passed until 1997. Under the National Wildlife
Refuge System Improvement Act, the primary mission of the system is now to conserve and to restore wildlife habitats. 124 However, multiple-use is embedded in wildlife refuge law, especially in
the Klamath, and specific uses control over the more ecosystem
conservation mandate.
The Klamath Project sits squarely in the Pacific Flyway, the
major migratory route for birds in western North America, and
refuges were created shortly after the Project was authorized. The
progressive conservation era had already reached the Klamath Basin by the time the Project was constructed. President Theodore
Roosevelt is credited with creating the first refuge in 1903 when he
set aside Pelican Island in Florida to preserve a breeding ground
for native birds. 125 Shortly thereafter, two wildlife refuges were
created in Tule and Lower Klamath Lakes. 126 The Tule Lake refuge has the distinction of being the first refuge to be superimposed
on “a watershed being revamped by the Reclamation Service.” 127
President Taft later established the Clear Lake National Wildlife
Refuge in 1911. 128 The refuge lands were within the project
boundaries. However, Reclamation Service botanists concluded
that the two could co-exist, and as a result ecosystem function and
services have been consistently subordinated to irrigation. 129
The Klamath refuges were not initially recognized as valuable
ecosystem fragments. They had to struggle to survive and to perform their wildlife conservation function, although refuges should
have been easy to maintain. The soils in the lower Klamath were
too alkaline for crops, but the pressures of settlement prevailed.
In 1915, President Wilson reduced the size of the Lower Klamath
123. See generally Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the
Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002); Robert L. Fischman, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the Development of United States
Conservation Policy, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2005)
124. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2).
125. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 76.
126. Id. at 79.
127. Id. at 77.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Lake Refuge from 80,000 to 53,600 acres. 130 A Lower Klamath
drainage basin district was organized, and the lake was drained
and reduced to a 365-acre pond. 131 Homesteading began in the
Tule Lake area in 1916 and did not end until 1949, one of the last
gaps in the great project of public land disposition. 132 In 1946,
during the last gasp of the nineteenth century homestead experiment, farmers in Tule Lake were threatened by the annual migration of waterfowl along the Pacific Flyway, and the Fish and Wildlife Service stepped in to practice what we might now call adaptive
management. Pressured to take action, the FWS tried a number of
methods to help the farmers clear their fields of waterfowl. Using
military surplus equipment such as smoke grenades, searchlights,
and small airplanes, the FWS herded the birds back into the refuges. The service also issued permits that allowed local farmers
and their Mexican laborers to scare birds from the fields with
shotguns and flares. The combined efforts of these groups contained the birds on the refuge until farmers completed their harvest. For the most part, the birds remained there until hunters
came to kill them after the beginning of hunting season in October
or until they flew south to their wintering grounds in California’s
Central Valley and Mexico. 133
The environmental consequences of the draining of the lake
were clear. The area turned into a “desert waste of dry peat and
alkali.” 134 The peat periodically burned. Restoration began in
1941, when excess water from Tule Lake was diverted back into
Lower Klamath and the birds returned. 135 Farmers learned to
leach the soils; thus, like many refuges, they receive nutrient-rich
return flows instead of clean water. 136 In 1964, Senator Thomas
Kuchel of California succeeded in passing legislation for the refuges. 137 Waterfowl management was declared the major purpose
of the refuge but “with full consideration to optimum agricultural
use.” 138 The federal government was authorized to lease lands in
the Upper and Lower Klamath refuges and the Tule Lake refuge
for crops. 139 This multiple use not only benefits farmers in refuges,
but over time, one of the rationales for crop raising is that migra130. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 78.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 81, 85.
133. Robert M. Wilson, Directing the Flow: Migratory Waterfowl, Scale, and Mobility in
Western America, 7 Environmental History 247 (2002).
134. BALANCING WATER, supra note 5, at 79.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 86.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 695l (1964).
139. Id.
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tory birds will feast in this area and fewer will fly on to the Central
Valley and eat higher valued crops. In fact, about seventy-five
percent of the leased lands in the refuge are for grain crops on
which the birds feed. Legislation passed in 1964 allows leasing,
but it does not protect farmers from the market. Farm sales decreased in the Refuge from some $30 million in the 1980s to
around $20 million in the 1990s. 140 An Environmental Assessment
disclosed substantial adverse impacts to the refuge’s ecosystem. 141
However, there has been no systematic assessment of the value of
its ecosystem services, although they can reasonably be expected to
increase substantially in the future as the area becomes more of a
“life style” destination. A 2002 Fish and Wildlife Study found that
visitor expenditures were around $2 million dollars and generated
$797,600 in employment income 142 at the same time that the Final
Environmental Assessment for the continued leasing program reported lease revenues of only $1,884,026 in 1996, the last year surveyed. 143 These ecosystem service values are expected to increase
in the future. Nonetheless, the FWS has implemented a pilot
“walking wetlands” program in the refuge. 144 Lands are alternatively drained, put into potato production, and then flooded.
The federal government has begun to claim reserved rights for
the refuges, but it is difficult to obtain sufficient quantities of water to adequately support the ecosystem to which they attached. 145
The problems start with the uncertainty about all water rights in
the basin. Despite over 100 years of project operation, the
Klamath Basin remains unadjudicated, although a state adjudication has been ongoing since 1975. 146 Thus, the irrigators enjoy a
vast advantage because their existing uses are de facto, but not
necessarily de jure, measures of their actual water rights, even
though they may in fact be entitled to less water than claimed. 147
In the Klamath adjudication, the U.S. Forest Service filed 212
claims, the Bureau of Land Management filed fifty-two, and the
140. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT ACTION, IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM ON TULE LAKE NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE 3.5.3 (2002), available at http://www.fws.gov/klamathbasinrefuges/Final
Environmental/AgProgramEa.pdf [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT].
141. Id. at 4.1.1.
142. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BANKING ON NATURE 2002: THE ECONOMIC
BENEFITS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE VISITATION 35 (2003),
available at http://www.fws.gov/southeast/grants/BankingOnNature2002_101403.pdf.
143. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 141, at 3.5.2.
144. Natural Resources Conservation Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Klamath Basin Conservation Partnership Accomplishments (2007), available at
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/feature/klamath/images/BrochureProgressReport2007.pdf.
145. See Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 303-05.
146. Id. at 302.
147. Id.
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Fish and Wildlife Service filed twenty-two claims for the four different refuges.
The federal government has focused more on Indian claims
than on refuge claims in the Klamath adjudication 148 and has
made major concessions to the irrigators. Nonetheless, Oregon
still contests the scope of the claimed rights. For example, the
United States agreed to take a 1985 priority date for the Klamath
Marsh National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon, although the priority
date would ordinarily be 1960, the date of the creation of the refuge. Oregon has agreed that the primary purpose of the refuge is
migratory bird conservation and thus even under New Mexico, the
United States is entitled to the minimum amount of water necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective. But the state has
taken a harder line on the rights claimed in the Upper Klamath
Wildlife Refuge with a 1928 priority date. President Hoover’s
original Executive Order described the purpose of the refuge as a
“breeding ground for birds and wild animals,” 149 but Congress described the purpose as “to preserve intact the necessary existing
habitat for migratory waterfowl in this vital area of the Pacific
flyway.” 150 Following the letter of New Mexico, Oregon claims that
any water rights can only be used to manage waterfowl. 151 These
narrow readings, if upheld, limit the ecosystem service potential of
the reserved right.
b. Indian Water Rights
Indian tribes can potentially claim federal water rights to large
amounts of water including ecosystem service claims, although the
latter have often been limited and must be adjudicated in state
proceedings. 152
Unfortunately, the Klamaths are unlikely to
match the success of other tribes with a large potential irrigable
reservation. 153 Historically, the main purpose of federal Indian
water rights has been to give Indians parity with white irrigators
to speed Indian assimilation. The primary standard for the right
is the practicable irrigable acreage (PIA) of the reservation. 154 The
Court came close to replacing the standard with one much more
148. E.g., Adair v. United States, 723 F.2d 1394, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1983).
149. Exec. Order No. 4851 (1928).
150. 16 U.S.C.A. § 695k (2006).
151. Memorandum from Walter Perry, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources
Section to Richard Bailey, Adjudicator, Water Resources Department, September 19, 1999.
152. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
153. BONNIE G. COLBY, JOHN E. THORSON & SARAH BRITTON, NEGOTIATING TRIBAL
WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST (2005).
154. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
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favorable to Indians, 155 but PIA remains the law. So far courts
have agreed that PIA does not require a positive benefit-cost
analysis and that tribes are not limited to farming methods in use
at the time that the reservation was created. 156
PIA does the Klamath Tribe and the ecosystem no good.
Nonetheless, the Klamath have successfully used the Winters 157
doctrine to increase their bargaining power within the basin and to
bolster the ecosystem, although no Indian water right is actually
devoted to ecosystem services. The Tribe first had to establish its
right to water even though its historic reservation had been terminated by Congress in the last gasp of assimilation during the
1950s. In the end, Winters rights were attached to the remnant
Tribe and to the lands severed from the reservation during the
first wave of assimilation, the allotment era. United States v.
Adair held that the Klamath Termination Act expressly preserved
pre-existing water rights, including an instream flow right necessary to effectuate the hunting and fishing rights reserved to the
Klamath Tribe by the 1864 treaty creating the reservation. 158
That water right, the court ruled, dated to time immemorial, not
merely to the 1864 treaty. With respect to allotted lands, the court
held that Indian successors to the lands had a right to a portion of
the tribal reserved right. 159 Non-Indian successors enjoyed a
slightly less secure right. 160 Non-Indians acquire an 1864 priority
to water sufficient to irrigate both the acreage under irrigation at
the time of transfer and any additional acreage that may be reasonably irrigated. 161
United States v. Adair was a significant and lasting tactical victory for the Klamath Tribe, but the Court of Appeals did not quantify the tribe’s reserved rights and left many questions unanswered. The instream flow right only gives the Tribes the right to
enjoin depletions of the river when they threaten to interfere with
protected hunting and fishing rights. 162 In 2001, the United States
155. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River system, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an equally divided Court sub nom. Wyoming v.
United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
156. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 695 (1983). The Supreme Court subsequently held
that non-Indian reserved rights were limited to the “principle purpose” of a land withdrawal. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 716. This standard potentially applies to Indian water
rights, but the Supreme Court has not limited Indian water rights as it has non-Indian federal reserved rights.
157. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1906).
158. 723 F.2d 1394, 1411-17.
159. Id. at 1415-17.
160. Id. at 1417.
161. Id. The right of non-Indian allottees had been previously recognized in Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411.
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and the Tribes asked the federal district court to reopen the Adair
decree to clarify the standard for determining the Tribe’s right after the Oregon Water Resources Department formally interpreted
Adair to limit Indian use to a moderate living capped by the low
level of hunting, fishing, and gathering activity in 1979. The district court subsequently expanded Adair to hold that the Tribe’s
treaty water entitles it to sufficient water levels to support the
necessary productive aquatic habitat which it defined as the habitat currently used, not that used in 1864. 163 This crabbed interpretation of the Tribe’s treaty entitlement was rejected by the federal district court. Instead, the Tribe has the right to whatever
water is necessary to achieve a supported habitat. 164
The current bottom line is that the existence of water rights
gives the Tribe important political and legal leverage, but has not
fundamentally changed the status quo. The Tribe’s potential
rights are counter-balanced by the ability of the irrigators to continue to divert water by water rights which have not yet been determined to be valid. Despite the Klamath Tribe’s victories between 1983 and 2005, the Tribe is still waiting for a quantified water right, while the Project and non-Project irrigators use much of
the basin’s water to grow crops. The Tribe’s right is essentially
negative. As the Ninth Circuit said in Adair, “the entitlement consists of the right to prevent other appropriators from depleting the
streams [sic] waters below a protected level in any area where the
non-consumptive right applies.” 165 Both the irrigators and the Indians will have to navigate their future in the context of a doctrine
that is both stable and evolving, but which remains biased in favor
of the status quo.
2. Are Coasian Bribes Possible in the Klamath?
Much of the writing on the provision of ecosystem services assumes that existing property rights are a barrier to service provision, and thus existing right holders should be “bribed” though
compensation to dedicate their property to ecosystem services.
There are two distinct primary rationales for taking property
rights as they lie. The first is instrumental. The arguments based
on this rationale range from the straight-forward “real politick”
argument that it is usually faster and cheaper to pay for the rights
than to contest them to more nuanced arguments that compensa163. United States v. Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278-79 (D. Or. 2002) vacated sub
nom. United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003).
164. Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273.
165. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411.
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tion is necessary to overcome cultural biases against ecosystem
service provision. 166 The second rationale is an ethical justification. Property rights are a guarantee against sudden majoritarian
changes in policy, regardless of the merits of the new policy. 167
Thus, clearly established rights must be respected. The two principal counter arguments are that the property right claimed may
be less established and free of risks of change than the holders assume and that payment creates a moral hazard problem. A moral
hazard is a law or social policy that encourages inefficient action
because there will be no penalty for taking it. 168
The Klamath farmers derive much of their political power from
their water entitlements, water rights perfected by hard work under the doctrine of prior appropriation and protected in a variety of
waters by Oregon as well as federal law. Irrigators have every incentive to hold their water rights until the harsh discipline of the
market takes effect and the federal government withdraws from
its historic role of buffering western farmers from this discipline.
The Klamath water right holders are also encouraged to continue
behavior with high potential private and social costs because they
know that they will be compensated for any losses that they incur
or that the government will bail them out, as it has, with emergency relief. The control of water in the Klamath is the key to the
basin’s destiny. Water entitlements are both a source and a manifestation of political power. The Klamath experience to date suggests that the case for sole reliance of a Coasian solution, which is
indifferent to the assignment of property rights, should be carefully examined. In addition to cultural resistance to the cold logic
of efficiency, the existence of firmly entrenched rights will push
authorities to adopt a solution that carries with it a high risk of
“sub-optimization” if not failure. For example, after the summer of
2001, the Bureau of Reclamation created a faux water bank in the
Klamath. 169 It is a faux bank because it is not a permanent pool of
water with deposits and withdrawals, but rather a series of ad hoc
payments to irrigators to either retire land or drill wells. 170 A
2005 GAO report concluded that Reclamation gas met its flow targets, but the actual reduction of water use was difficult to quantify
166. Elmendorf, supra note 65.
167. See, e.g., Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland Protection,
19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59 (2003). For a reply see Mark W. Cordes, Fairness and Farmland Preservation: A Response to Professor Richardson, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 371, 372
(2005).
168. For an excellent analysis of these issues, see James Salzman, Creating Markets for
Ecosystem Services, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870 (2005).
169. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 327-28.
170. Id.
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because Reclamation lacks “effective flow measurement equipment
and monitoring data for the Klamath Project.” 171 The net result
was the Bureau accelerated groundwater depletion and did not
provide enough water for downstream Coho Salmon support. 172
Finally, the rush to a Coasian solution also creates no incentive to
explore the extent to which the claimed existing entitlements are
immune to readjustment. Water rights are as much about risk as
they are about stability. The focus should be on the actual expectations that lie behind a use 173 so that alternative ways of satisfying those expectations can be accommodated.
3. The ESA
As previously mentioned, the environmental movement
reached the Klamath primarily through the ESA. The Act has the
potential to reallocate water rights, although any reallocation is
likely to be seasonable. Courts have consistently held that the existence of a vested state water right is no defense to compliance
with the Act. 174 Two courts of claims have split on the issue of
whether withheld deliveries constitute a taking. 175 The earlier discussion of the ESA suggested that the Act is less of a catalyst than
many hope because the Act is vulnerable to reinterpretation in
ways that make it difficult, but not impossible, to challenge in
court. In brief, after the 2001 summer and the interim National
Research Council report, which rejected the Fish and Wildlife Service’s conclusion on Upper Klamath Lake levels and questioned its
conclusions about the need for downstream Coho salmon flows, the
Bureau issued a new BiOp. 176 The 2002 BiOp designated a relatively wet period, 1990-1999, as the baseline, and the Bureau developed a ten-year operating plan for the project. Upper Klamath
Lake levels would be maintained at levels no lower than the average end-of-end elevations over a ten-year period and daily average
Klamath River flows would be no lower than ten year averages
171. GAO, supra note 91, at 25.
172. Id. at 25-28.
173. This analysis echoes and recasts the Progressive Era concern that the monopolization of water rights would prevent the more widespread distribution of access to water to the
detriment of society’s interest in the conservation of resources. For example, the great treatise
writer Samuel Wiel, in Water Rights in the Western States, floated the idea that unreasonable
assertions of priority would not be recognized. SAMUEL WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 329-40 (3d ed. 1911),
174. Fish, Farms, and the Clash, supra note 3, at 310-11.
175. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (U.S. Ct.
Fed. Claims 2001) (finding there was a taking); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
67 Fed. Cl. 504 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2005) (finding there was not a taking).
176. BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 38.
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plus a 10,000 acre foot April pulse for downstream smolt migration. 177
The story of how the Bush II Bureau of Reclamation and Department of Interior quickly tilted the balance from fish to farmers
is both a tale of the legitimate use of the political process and the
legacy of the environmental movement to limit the use of oldfashioned influence politics to undermine statutes. A 2002 report
by the National Research Council took the Bureau off the hook for
Upper Klamath lake levels and cast doubt on the benefit of minimum flows for the Coho, but not for downstream flows. 178 However, instead, of trying to implement its call for a broad menu of
ecosystem restoration measures, the Bureau tried to protect the
irrigators from all risks in its “creative” 2002 BiOp. 179 The tenyear plan was a deft way to push the problem as far into the future
as possible by transferring the risks from upstream to downstream
species in contravention to the mandates of the ESA. Under pressure, the National Marine Fisheries Service ultimately acceded to
the 2002 BiOp, but with serious reservations. 180 NMFS was concerned primarily with the fact that because the Bureau had
pushed the dates for full compliance with the target levels and
flows to the end of the ten-year period, 181 “the mean flows for each
water year type will decline toward the minimums that occurred
during the reference period,” 182 which “is expected to increase the
risk of extinction to Klamath Basin Coho Salmon” 183 and the many
scientific uncertainties in the assumptions behind the opinion.
Not surprisingly, courts found that the plan did not adequately
protect the Coho and invalidated most of it. 184 To date, the downstream fisherman have not benefited from the decision; as previously mentioned, the 2006 Coho season was virtually eliminated
because of low runs.
This is a familiar problem when courts apply the ESA to existing entitlements. A similar story occurred on the Missouri River.
In 2002 the National Research Council issued a report calling for
the development of a new flow regime on the river to protect endangered species and biodiversity generally. 185 NGOs won a major
177. Id.
178. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING
PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY (2002) (I was a member of the NRC committee that produced the
report).
179. BR FINAL 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 38.
180. NMFS 2002 BIOP, supra note 85.
181. Id. at 63.
182. Id. at 36.
183. Id. at 49.
184. See infra note 108.
185. NMFS 2002 BIOP, supra note 85 at 52-45.
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decision compelling the United States Army Corps of Engineers to
release more water in the spring and less in the summer to benefit
a listed fish, 186 but the Department of Interior replaced the original team which issued the Biological Opinion which provided the
support for the modified flow regime. A new opinion appeared,
recommending against the original spring-summer release plan,
and a federal district court upheld it. 187 The Missouri ecosystem is
still at risk.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Klamath is a classic illustration of market underproduction to public goods. 188 Instead of long term solutions, those
that emerge tend toward the negative state of affairs described by
a leading Italian anti-Fascist diplomat in characterizing his objective in negotiating a post-World War I treaty between Italy and
the newly created Yugoslavia: “that the causes of discontent
should be equally divided between the two nations.” 189 This may
be the best that one can hope for among nation states, but ecosystem and biodiversity conservation require a more affirmative response if this laudable objective is to be realized.
The modification of the unsustainable status quo in the
Klamath with institutions that recognize the value of the Basin’s
ecosystem services and encourage their production, by payments or
legal duties, remains an unfulfilled aspiration in the Klamath.
There are, however, some hopeful signs. The relicensing of Iron
Gate dam has created a forum. The existence of entrenched property rights combined with a Bureau of Reclamation committed to
supporting them to the maximum extent possible with the ESA
creates powerful incentives not to seek a permanent solution built
around ecosystem service provision. Litigation to compel stringent
regulation or to prevent it remains the preferred mode of problem
solving. Let us hope that in the twenty-first century, the real
happy endings are not just in sports.
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